The failsafe used to watch management traffic for as long as STP ran, so
three minutes of nobody looking at the web UI took the tree down on any
quiet network. That made a standing STP config impractical, which is the
problem raised in the review of the original PR.
Enabling STP arms a window of stp_failsafe_s seconds. One HTTP request
inside it confirms that management survived the new tree and disarms the
watchdog; a silent window disables STP and restores forwarding. Both
outcomes print to the console and the syslog.
The window re-arms on any later event that newly takes a port out of
forwarding: a port rejoining via "stp port N on", root guard firing, the
loop latch. Those were covered by the old always-on surveillance and a
disarmed window would have left them able to cut management off for good.
If management traffic keeps flowing past the new block, the next request
confirms straight away, which is the correct verdict, the block did not
cut it. The arming deliberately does not refresh an already armed window:
root guard can re-fire on every hello, and refreshing the countdown on
each one would keep a cut-off window from ever expiring. A stable network
with nothing newly blocked never re-arms, which is the reviewed-for
behaviour.
The request or console command that causes the arming never counts as its
own confirmation: mgmt_alive is cleared when a command arms, and the
console hook only disarms when the window predates the command. Without
that, enabling from the web UI or the console would confirm the window
before the new tree had any chance to cut management off.
A command on the serial console confirms like HTTP does. An operator at
the console has out-of-band access that no tree can cut, so the automatic
restore only takes STP away from someone equipped to deal with the
situation. The hook sits on the interactive console path only, identified
by cmd_available, so neither the config replay at boot nor HTTP commands
pass through it.
After a confirmation STP runs unsupervised until something new blocks.
Headless installs where nobody will confirm should set stp failsafe 0;
doc/stp.md says so.
Costs two bytes of XDATA, the armed flag and the console-path snapshot;
stp.rel and rtlplayground.rel keep their segment sizes.
A port set to admit tagged frames only will never see a BPDU, because
delivery rides the forward action and the ingress pipeline drops untagged
frames before the L2 lookup. The failure is silent and looks like a dead
receive path: the port turns edge after three seconds, the bridge elects
itself root, and nothing hints at the ingress setting. Diagnosing exactly
that cost most of a day on a live switch, with the neighbour provably
transmitting the whole time.
stp_setup() now prints one line per affected port, so the hint lands at
"stp on" and at every config replay on boot. The check runs in its own
loop after the MSTP write: port_ingress_filter_get() reads a register
into sfr_data, which the state-building loop above is still using. The
port number in the message is physical, matching what the ingress
command takes.
doc/stp.md explains why this can happen here and not on a normal bridge,
where BPDUs are consumed before any VLAN classification.
stp.rel stays at DSEG 5 with no OSEG and the image at 10498 bytes of
XDATA.
The wording read as a claim about the CPU interface in general, which is
wrong and misleading: the 8051 sits behind an ordinary port of the internal
switch and is an ordinary member of a forwarding mask - which is exactly
what this implementation relies on.
Say what is actually broken instead: the trap action, a separate mechanism
whose destination is an external CPU port these boards do not populate.
Record the measurements behind it, including the widened CPU_PMSK and both
external-CPU destinations, and add the ACL trap result - a rule matching the
group intercepts frames but does not deliver them either, which is a second,
independent path to the same conclusion.
Reported-by: vDorst
Covers enabling it, the bridge and per-port settings, how BPDUs are
delivered on this hardware (RMA forward constrained by a CPU-only static
L2 entry, since trap-to-CPU targets an external CPU these boards do not
have), the timer base, and the management failsafe - enabling STP over
the network can block the very port the management VLAN rides on, so
that part is spelled out rather than left to be discovered.
* add MACHINE_SWTG024AS_A_2_0_1_5_RJ45
* fix(machine): update SFP port LED color descriptions for PCB-SWTG024AS V2.0
* add(doc): create a simple documentation for SWTG024AS-A-V2.0.1_5_RJ45
* refactor(machine): update machine definition
The ZX310S-4T2XT is a managed device with 2x2.5GBit and 2x10GBit Ethernet.
It is sold, among others, by Horaco as an unbranded device.
CPU: RTL8372
Flash: 2MByte Winbond W25Q16DV (U3)
PHY 2x RTL8261BE
I recently brought a "Ztyuav Z-QWYT0402", the insides looked identical to the
existing supported "Hisource Hi-K0402WS". Both of them have the
"PCB-K0402-V3.0" silkscreen.
I flashed the vanilla image and it seems to work great.
I changed the documentation to be more inclusive of other devices (including
adding a picture of mine). I suspect more devices might fall into this
"PCB-K0402-V3.0" bucket, for example the "YuanLey YS25-0402" with
the vlan switch also looks suspiciously identical from the outside.
I also added some details I noticed while flashing mine:
teardown, flash padding, how the selector switch actually works.
Adds CLI reference for the previously undocumented vlan <id> mgmt
command, including the disable case (vlan 0 mgmt), default state,
and a lockout warning.
Fixes#235
- machine.c/h: add MACHINE_FNS1200P with verified GPIO assignments for
both SFP ports, LED SET0 (amber 2.5G / green 1G-100M-10M) and SET1
(SFP all-speeds), led_mux from original firmware register dump, and
machine_custom_init() enabling LED_GLB_IO_EN bit 6
- doc/devices/FNS-1200P.md: device overview, port layout, serial
console (S1 three through-holes = UART0 115200 8N1 3.3V),
LED and SFP GPIO tables
- doc/devices/photos/FNS-1200P/: chassis front panel and PCB top photos
- doc/supported_devices.md: add FNS-1200P to the list
GPIO assignments and LED register values were cross-checked between
live GPIO observation (RTLPlayground gpio command) and an original
firmware register dump.
* Revise compiling section and add cautionary notes
Updated compiling instructions and added warnings about flashing procedures.
* Refactor caution messages in README.md
Updated caution messages to use new formatting for emphasis.
* Revise caution and reminder notes in README
Updated caution and reminder sections for clarity and consistency.
* Fix typos in README regarding firmware update
Corrected typo errors in the README.
* Add image for advanced settings
Add advanced_seetings.png
* Add advanced settings configuration details to README
Added advanced settings section with configuration instructions.
* Fix image source in README for advanced settings
Corrected the image source filename for advanced settings.
* Revise IP and port command descriptions in README
Updated command descriptions in README for clarity.
* Revise README.md for clarity and updated instructions
Updated sections in README.md for clarity and accuracy, including compiling requirements, installation instructions, and cautionary notes.
* Revise README for clarity and emphasis
Updated formatting and emphasized important notes in the README.
* Correct image file name and compilation output in README
Updated README to reflect changes in image file names and compilation output.
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d00f
Priit Laes
ZYT
Lynn-Becky
logicog
Your Name
René van Dorst
Ron
th0m4sek
HL Yi
feelfree69
logicog
Alexandru M Stan
Erdnusschokolade
Taiga Ogawa
feelfree69
dobodu
Mark Captur