Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
d00f 3189820ba0 httpd: send Connection: close (single-connection uIP mitigation)
Real root cause of the "web login fails from a browser but works from curl":
the uIP httpd is built with UIP_CONF_MAX_CONNECTIONS = 1 and uses global
response state (outbuf/slen/session), i.e. it serves exactly one TCP connection
at a time and closes it after each response - but never advertises that via
the Connection header. A browser's HTTP/1.1 client therefore assumes the
connection may be persistent and can park it in its keep-alive pool for reuse;
a later request sent on that pooled connection hits one the server has already
closed, and a POST (unlike a GET) is never retried by the browser, so it can
be silently lost this way.

This adds "Connection: close" to every response so the browser does not pool
and reuse a connection the server is about to drop. On its own this did not
fully explain the reported login failures - the actual authentication bug is
fixed in the next commit (the Cookie header parsed at a fixed offset) - but it
is correct behaviour for a server that only ever handles one connection, and
removes one source of dropped requests.
2026-07-21 06:47:44 +02:00
d00f ed74ec1e97 httpd/login: complete CSP + password autocomplete hint
Two hygiene fixes for the web UI, prompted by a login that appeared to fail
under privacy shields (Brave Shields / NoScript-family extensions):

- httpd: replace the partial "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'" CSP with a
  complete, first-party policy (default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
  'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:;
  connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'). Everything the UI needs is
  same-origin; the explicit policy stops shields injecting their own
  restrictive report-only probes (the noisy script-src-elem 'none' console
  spam) and passes a strict-CSP audit. Verified: no CSP violations in-browser.
- login.html: add autocomplete="current-password" so password managers
  recognise the field (they showed "unknown password" without it).

NOTE: these do NOT bypass a browser's LAN-device protection (NoScript "lan" /
Brave Shields), which strips the POST body of requests to a LAN address and is
why the login can fail in-browser while the same credentials work over curl.
That is a deliberate browser security feature; the user must allow the site in
their shields to log in. The backend password (default 1234) is unchanged and
correct.
2026-07-21 06:47:10 +02:00