CONFIG_UPLOAD_BUF at 2560 capped a configuration upload at about 2.2K
while the config sector holds 4K. Size the buffer as CONFIG_LEN plus
room for the multipart framing so the whole sector is usable.
config_take() wrote the payload without checking it against the sector:
safe before only because the buffer could not hold an oversized one.
Reject a payload that does not fit CONFIG_LEN, terminator included,
instead of writing past the erased sector.
Saving the configuration works in Chrome and fails in Firefox, and the
difference is only how each browser splits the request. The handler
erased the config sector as soon as the request started and then parsed
the multipart body one TCP segment at a time, which requires every
boundary and every part header to fall inside a single segment. Firefox
splits inside a part header, so the parser lost its place and the
erased sector was left holding a truncated body or nothing at all. A
single-burst scripted post lost the whole body the same way.
The configuration is limited to two kilobytes, so the whole request body
now accumulates in xdata and is parsed only after the closing boundary
has arrived. The parts are walked in one pass, the part carrying a
filename is written to a freshly erased sector, and the client receives
a 200 instead of the previous silent close. No segmentation can confuse
this, since the parser only ever sees a complete body.
Locating the closing boundary first also bounds the walk over the parts,
since none can lie beyond it, so the length of the buffer is no longer
the bound and the test for the two trailing dashes is unnecessary.
The walk matches at offsets inside a buffer that is not terminated, so
neither existing helper fits: strcmp() goes on to compare the byte after
the match and is_word_x() demands a separator there. Add strstart() and
strstart_x() for that case, and use strlen_x() for the boundary length.
The firmware upload path still streams, since a megabyte cannot be
buffered, and is untouched.
The handler took one raw character of the request line and passed it to
send_counters(), which uses it to index machine.phys_to_log_port. That
array has nine entries and the character is whatever the client sent, so
the read ran up to 246 entries past the end and the result went on to
STAT_GET as a port number. is_word() accepts any request whose name is
followed by a question mark, so nothing constrained the byte to a digit.
Bounding it where it is read keeps the check beside the assumption it
protects and needs nothing from the machine description. sdcc leaves
plain char unsigned and the subtraction wraps in eight bits, so a byte
below '0' comes out above 200 and one upper test covers both ends:
exactly '0' to '8' now reach send_counters. The compiled test is
add a,#0xf7 followed by jnc, which I read back out of the assembly rather
than assuming.
Out of range answers 400 by the path the other malformed requests already
take, rather than an empty array. An empty array would have been worse
than useless here, since the statistics page calls BigInt on the first
element before it looks at the length. The page asks only for index zero
to the port count minus one, so nothing that answered before stops
answering, and a non-200 reply makes its handler do nothing at all.
11 bytes of BANK1, nothing in the common segment, BANK2, xdata or
internal RAM. Built for SWTGW218AS and KP_9000_6XHML_X2 on sdcc 4.5.0.
The POST path tests for a NUL before it looks at a byte. The GET path did not,
and is_separator() counts only space, tab, question mark and equals, so a request
line carrying none of those walks past the end of uip_buf and writes its
terminator into whatever xdata it happens to stop on.
Everything that is not a POST reaches that walk. The pointer advances past the
method before anything checks that the method was GET, so a TLS record sent to
port 80 by a browser trying https first is enough on its own, as is a port
scanner or a malformed line. The stop is wherever the first space, tab, question
mark or equals turns up in memory, which is why the symptoms are erratic.
Two bytes of BANK1. BANK2 and xdata do not move.
Root cause of the "browser login always bounces back with Wrong password!
while curl works": scan_header() read the session id from a fixed offset
into the Cookie header (p + 17), assuming "session=" is the first and only
cookie. Browsers keep stale cookies for a long time - e.g. an "admin" cookie
left over from this switch's VENDOR firmware - so the header can arrive as
"Cookie: admin=..; session=..", the fixed offset then points into the admin
value, authentication silently fails and every page bounces to login although
the password had been accepted. curl sends only "session=", which is why
command-line tests passed while a real browser (with that stale cookie) failed.
- scan_header(): scan the Cookie header for the actual "session=" key
(matched as "session" - is_word() requires a separator after the pattern
and '=' is on its list, the first value byte is not).
- is_word_x(): accept ';' as a terminating separator so the session value
also matches when it is not the last cookie in the header.
Verified on hardware end-to-end in a real browser WITH the stale "admin"
cookie present: login -> index.html, all pages and JSON endpoints work.
Real root cause of the "web login fails from a browser but works from curl":
the uIP httpd is built with UIP_CONF_MAX_CONNECTIONS = 1 and uses global
response state (outbuf/slen/session), i.e. it serves exactly one TCP connection
at a time and closes it after each response - but never advertises that via
the Connection header. A browser's HTTP/1.1 client therefore assumes the
connection may be persistent and can park it in its keep-alive pool for reuse;
a later request sent on that pooled connection hits one the server has already
closed, and a POST (unlike a GET) is never retried by the browser, so it can
be silently lost this way.
This adds "Connection: close" to every response so the browser does not pool
and reuse a connection the server is about to drop. On its own this did not
fully explain the reported login failures - the actual authentication bug is
fixed in the next commit (the Cookie header parsed at a fixed offset) - but it
is correct behaviour for a server that only ever handles one connection, and
removes one source of dropped requests.
Two hygiene fixes for the web UI, prompted by a login that appeared to fail
under privacy shields (Brave Shields / NoScript-family extensions):
- httpd: replace the partial "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'" CSP with a
complete, first-party policy (default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:;
connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'). Everything the UI needs is
same-origin; the explicit policy stops shields injecting their own
restrictive report-only probes (the noisy script-src-elem 'none' console
spam) and passes a strict-CSP audit. Verified: no CSP violations in-browser.
- login.html: add autocomplete="current-password" so password managers
recognise the field (they showed "unknown password" without it).
NOTE: these do NOT bypass a browser's LAN-device protection (NoScript "lan" /
Brave Shields), which strips the POST body of requests to a LAN address and is
why the login can fail in-browser while the same credentials work over curl.
That is a deliberate browser security feature; the user must allow the site in
their shields to log in. The backend password (default 1234) is unchanged and
correct.
On a QSFPTEK QT-SFP+-T (RTL8261C) 10GBase-T module, the diag type field
(92) comes back as 0x00, but there's actually some statistics available
like temperature. Other metrics may be hard-coded values.
Add a basic struct that allows matching on vendor and/or model, using a
bitfield to allow multiple quirks for a given SFP module. Only
SFP_QUIRK_DDM is implemented.
For modules matching SFP_QUIRK_DDM, attempt an I2C read of the MSB of
module voltage during probe if DDM is "unsupported" - if it's not 0xff,
override the reported options so we can pull the diagnostic data.
To allow simpler comparisons, convert the ASCII fields (vendor,
model, serial) from space-padded to standard NULL-terminated strings.
strcmp() is moved from httpd.c to rtlplayground.c alongside other string
functions and shared between them.
The __reentrant keyword is used for the new functions to avoid using up
additional OSEG space. This allocates the variables on the stack, which
is OK for this particular code path.
The JSON assembly in send_status() is slightly modified to treat the
sfp_module_* data as standard NULL-terminated strings, and a repeated
subtraction was moved into a uint8_t to declutter the code.
Returns a JSON array of all configured VLANs with their IDs and names,
e.g. [{"id":1,"name":""},{"id":20,"name":"IoT"}].
The endpoint iterates VLAN IDs 1..4094 and filters by the validity bit
in sfr_data[0] (0x02), following the same pattern as vlan_create() and
vlan_setup() in rtl837x_port.c.
Also adds a small itoa16_html() helper for emitting decimal numbers
up to 4 digits (analogous to the existing 8-bit itoa_html()), used
for VLAN IDs which can reach 4094. Response builder uses the existing
vlan_name() helper for the name lookup, consistent with send_vlan().
Buffer overflow is prevented by breaking out of the iteration loop at
TCP_OUTBUF_SIZE - 60.
This endpoint is the foundation for upcoming UI improvements
(VLAN selector dropdown and overview table).
With content_type = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "+" means space.
This case was not handled.
Also refactor the code to make a loop to process the hex digits.
Chrome sends upload requests using POST with multipart/form-data
content type in multiple packets for the header part of the form-data.
Introduce a TSTATE_MULTIPART for the httpd server states that denotes
that so far only a part of the multipart header has been transmitted.
Once the full header has been transmitted, we change to TSTATE_POST
as for Firefox which sends all the multipart header in one piece.
The main further change required then is to make sure that the parsing
of the initial part of the multipart request is only parsed once and initially
to distinguish between configuration and firmware uploads.
René van Dorst
bloqaudio
d00f
Priit Laes
Matt Merhar
TylerDurden-23
feelfree69
Erdnusschokolade
logicog
logicog
UAb5eSMn
orbisai0security
chriz