Only httpd.c conflicted: main added the buffered configuration upload
next to the pointers this branch had moved into xdata to free internal
RAM. Both belong, so the new globals sit above declarations that keep
their storage class.
CONFIG_UPLOAD_BUF at 2560 capped a configuration upload at about 2.2K
while the config sector holds 4K. Size the buffer as CONFIG_LEN plus
room for the multipart framing so the whole sector is usable.
config_take() wrote the payload without checking it against the sector:
safe before only because the buffer could not hold an oversized one.
Reject a payload that does not fit CONFIG_LEN, terminator included,
instead of writing past the erased sector.
Saving the configuration works in Chrome and fails in Firefox, and the
difference is only how each browser splits the request. The handler
erased the config sector as soon as the request started and then parsed
the multipart body one TCP segment at a time, which requires every
boundary and every part header to fall inside a single segment. Firefox
splits inside a part header, so the parser lost its place and the
erased sector was left holding a truncated body or nothing at all. A
single-burst scripted post lost the whole body the same way.
The configuration is limited to two kilobytes, so the whole request body
now accumulates in xdata and is parsed only after the closing boundary
has arrived. The parts are walked in one pass, the part carrying a
filename is written to a freshly erased sector, and the client receives
a 200 instead of the previous silent close. No segmentation can confuse
this, since the parser only ever sees a complete body.
Locating the closing boundary first also bounds the walk over the parts,
since none can lie beyond it, so the length of the buffer is no longer
the bound and the test for the two trailing dashes is unnecessary.
The walk matches at offsets inside a buffer that is not terminated, so
neither existing helper fits: strcmp() goes on to compare the byte after
the match and is_word_x() demands a separator there. Add strstart() and
strstart_x() for that case, and use strlen_x() for the boundary length.
The firmware upload path still streams, since a megabyte cannot be
buffered, and is untouched.
The window could be armed from the serial console but only ever disarmed
by an HTTP request. save_cmd, which gates arming, is cleared only while
execute_config() replays the startup config, so every interactive command
armed it wherever it was typed, while mgmt_alive, which disarms it, was
written in exactly one place, on HTTP traffic. An operator working
entirely on the serial console therefore lost STP 180 seconds after
enabling it however much they typed, which is what makes the mechanism
impossible to test from a console.
The documentation described the behaviour that was intended rather than
the one that was built, and in both directions: it said a command on the
serial console also confirms, and it said a reboot with STP in the
startup config disables it again three minutes later. Neither held. The
replay path never armed the window at all.
Repairing the asymmetry would have kept a mechanism whose premise is
contested anyway. A watchdog that switches the protection off in response
to silence adds a second failure mode on top of the first: where the
network is misconfigured and STP is the thing holding a storm back,
restoring forwarding removes the last reason management still answers.
Gone with it: the stp failsafe command, the fs and fsT fields of
/stp.json, the input and the tripped banner on the Spanning Tree page,
the two persistence patterns in config.js, the documentation section, and
mgmt_alive itself, which had no other reader.
550 bytes back, 145 of BANK1 and 405 of BANK2, and five of xdata, which
is the four counters and mgmt_alive and nothing else. Built for
SWTGW218AS and KP_9000_6XHML_X2 on sdcc 4.5.0.
Enabling STP on a bridge whose management rides an in-band VLAN can cut
off that very management - and not only by our own blocking: on this
network the upstream TP-Link Easy Smart switch's "loop prevention"
reacted to our BPDU hellos by blocking ITS port towards us while our
ASIC was all-forwarding, isolating the whole segment until a power
cycle. Recoverable only by going quiet.
Add a commit-confirm watchdog: while STP is enabled, any HTTP request
re-arms a countdown ("stp failsafe <seconds>", default 180, 0 disables);
if management stays silent for the whole window, STP disables itself,
which also stops BPDU TX so a neighbour's loop protection can release
its block. The web UI polls /stp.json every 2 s, so an open browser
naturally keeps the watchdog re-armed. The trip is reported via
/stp.json (fs, fsT) and as a warning on the Spanning Tree page.
Deliberately not conditioned on our own MSTP port states - the incident
above proves the uplink can be dead while every local port forwards.
Also bound the NIC DMA busy-waits (nic_tx_packet, nic_rx_header,
nic_rx_packet): an unbounded spin on SFR_NIC_CTRL freezes the entire
main loop (timers, HTTP, ARP) if the ASIC ever fails to consume a
transfer; give up after ~65k polls and drop the frame instead.
Hardware-verified end to end: with priority 15 against a live RSTP
bridge the uplink died 6 s after "stp on" and the network recovered BY
ITSELF 66 s later (trip at 45 s + neighbour release), fsT=1, LACP and
LAN intact. Telemetry via syslog-to-edge-port host confirmed the full
chain: countdown 44->4, trip, hello TX stopping at the trip.
(cherry picked from commit 1fa9775156fd6d7ebfdda2382f73430b86601230)
Implements the standard 802.1D-2004/802.1w configuration surface:
Bridge: priority (0-15 x4096), hello time, max age, forward delay,
force-version (RSTP v2 / STP-compatible v0 Config BPDUs), tx hold
count (per-port per-second BPDU budget).
Per port: enable, admin edge (forwarding immediately - no listen gap),
auto edge (forwarding after 3 s of BPDU silence; DEFAULT, so
host-facing ports no longer take the full forward delay),
path cost (0=auto/20000), port priority, BPDU guard (port disabled
on BPDU receipt), root guard (never accept a better root on the
port), BPDU filter (no BPDUs in or out).
Engine additions: root max-age expiry (reclaim the tree when the root goes
silent), root path cost accounting (rx cost + root-port cost, advertised in
our BPDUs), loop detection (our own BPDU coming back blocks the port for a
listen period), topology-change counter, approximated per-port roles
(Root/Designated/Alternate) for diagnostics.
CLI: "stp prio|hello|maxage|fwd|txhold|version ..." and
"stp port <n> on|off|edge|cost|prio|guard|filter ..." (stp_parse, delegated
from cmd_parser); all forms accepted by the startup-config validator so the
whole configuration persists. /stp.json now reports config + status; the
Spanning Tree page exposes everything with immediate-apply controls and live
state/role columns (edit-in-flight guard against the 2 s refresh).
8051 memory: the module moves to code BANK2; internal-RAM pressure from
cross-bank calls resolved by xdata loop iterators/scratch, __reentrant on
the small helpers, and moving httpd's header-pointer globals to xdata.
Verified on hardware (SWTGW218AS): defaults land per standard; priority and
hello change live; admin-edge ports (the LACP bond uplinks) keep the LAN at
0% loss THROUGH "stp on"; auto-edge ports forward after 3 s; a port that
heard real BPDUs (a VM bridge behind physical port 6) correctly declined
auto-edge, sat out the full listen period and became Designated; tc counts
promotions; we win the root election at priority 16384 vs 32768.
(cherry picked from commit 09a34dc6acdc81ab9cab0727d2f4a59c68131a3e)
Add a Spanning Tree page: an on/off toggle driving the existing "stp"
command over /cmd, and a live status section fed by a new /stp.json
endpoint - the elected root bridge (priority + MAC), our path cost,
whether we are the root, and the per-port STP state read live from the
ASIC's MSTP register (same 2-bit encoding stp_setup() writes). Ports are
reported by their physical numbers.
Recovered-from: 3132319, 9365c86
The handler took one raw character of the request line and passed it to
send_counters(), which uses it to index machine.phys_to_log_port. That
array has nine entries and the character is whatever the client sent, so
the read ran up to 246 entries past the end and the result went on to
STAT_GET as a port number. is_word() accepts any request whose name is
followed by a question mark, so nothing constrained the byte to a digit.
Bounding it where it is read keeps the check beside the assumption it
protects and needs nothing from the machine description. sdcc leaves
plain char unsigned and the subtraction wraps in eight bits, so a byte
below '0' comes out above 200 and one upper test covers both ends:
exactly '0' to '8' now reach send_counters. The compiled test is
add a,#0xf7 followed by jnc, which I read back out of the assembly rather
than assuming.
Out of range answers 400 by the path the other malformed requests already
take, rather than an empty array. An empty array would have been worse
than useless here, since the statistics page calls BigInt on the first
element before it looks at the length. The page asks only for index zero
to the port count minus one, so nothing that answered before stops
answering, and a non-200 reply makes its handler do nothing at all.
11 bytes of BANK1, nothing in the common segment, BANK2, xdata or
internal RAM. Built for SWTGW218AS and KP_9000_6XHML_X2 on sdcc 4.5.0.
The POST path tests for a NUL before it looks at a byte. The GET path did not,
and is_separator() counts only space, tab, question mark and equals, so a request
line carrying none of those walks past the end of uip_buf and writes its
terminator into whatever xdata it happens to stop on.
Everything that is not a POST reaches that walk. The pointer advances past the
method before anything checks that the method was GET, so a TLS record sent to
port 80 by a browser trying https first is enough on its own, as is a port
scanner or a malformed line. The stop is wherever the first space, tab, question
mark or equals turns up in memory, which is why the symptoms are erratic.
Two bytes of BANK1. BANK2 and xdata do not move.
Root cause of the "browser login always bounces back with Wrong password!
while curl works": scan_header() read the session id from a fixed offset
into the Cookie header (p + 17), assuming "session=" is the first and only
cookie. Browsers keep stale cookies for a long time - e.g. an "admin" cookie
left over from this switch's VENDOR firmware - so the header can arrive as
"Cookie: admin=..; session=..", the fixed offset then points into the admin
value, authentication silently fails and every page bounces to login although
the password had been accepted. curl sends only "session=", which is why
command-line tests passed while a real browser (with that stale cookie) failed.
- scan_header(): scan the Cookie header for the actual "session=" key
(matched as "session" - is_word() requires a separator after the pattern
and '=' is on its list, the first value byte is not).
- is_word_x(): accept ';' as a terminating separator so the session value
also matches when it is not the last cookie in the header.
Verified on hardware end-to-end in a real browser WITH the stale "admin"
cookie present: login -> index.html, all pages and JSON endpoints work.
Real root cause of the "web login fails from a browser but works from curl":
the uIP httpd is built with UIP_CONF_MAX_CONNECTIONS = 1 and uses global
response state (outbuf/slen/session), i.e. it serves exactly one TCP connection
at a time and closes it after each response - but never advertises that via
the Connection header. A browser's HTTP/1.1 client therefore assumes the
connection may be persistent and can park it in its keep-alive pool for reuse;
a later request sent on that pooled connection hits one the server has already
closed, and a POST (unlike a GET) is never retried by the browser, so it can
be silently lost this way.
This adds "Connection: close" to every response so the browser does not pool
and reuse a connection the server is about to drop. On its own this did not
fully explain the reported login failures - the actual authentication bug is
fixed in the next commit (the Cookie header parsed at a fixed offset) - but it
is correct behaviour for a server that only ever handles one connection, and
removes one source of dropped requests.
Two hygiene fixes for the web UI, prompted by a login that appeared to fail
under privacy shields (Brave Shields / NoScript-family extensions):
- httpd: replace the partial "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'" CSP with a
complete, first-party policy (default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:;
connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'). Everything the UI needs is
same-origin; the explicit policy stops shields injecting their own
restrictive report-only probes (the noisy script-src-elem 'none' console
spam) and passes a strict-CSP audit. Verified: no CSP violations in-browser.
- login.html: add autocomplete="current-password" so password managers
recognise the field (they showed "unknown password" without it).
NOTE: these do NOT bypass a browser's LAN-device protection (NoScript "lan" /
Brave Shields), which strips the POST body of requests to a LAN address and is
why the login can fail in-browser while the same credentials work over curl.
That is a deliberate browser security feature; the user must allow the site in
their shields to log in. The backend password (default 1234) is unchanged and
correct.
On a QSFPTEK QT-SFP+-T (RTL8261C) 10GBase-T module, the diag type field
(92) comes back as 0x00, but there's actually some statistics available
like temperature. Other metrics may be hard-coded values.
Add a basic struct that allows matching on vendor and/or model, using a
bitfield to allow multiple quirks for a given SFP module. Only
SFP_QUIRK_DDM is implemented.
For modules matching SFP_QUIRK_DDM, attempt an I2C read of the MSB of
module voltage during probe if DDM is "unsupported" - if it's not 0xff,
override the reported options so we can pull the diagnostic data.
To allow simpler comparisons, convert the ASCII fields (vendor,
model, serial) from space-padded to standard NULL-terminated strings.
strcmp() is moved from httpd.c to rtlplayground.c alongside other string
functions and shared between them.
The __reentrant keyword is used for the new functions to avoid using up
additional OSEG space. This allocates the variables on the stack, which
is OK for this particular code path.
The JSON assembly in send_status() is slightly modified to treat the
sfp_module_* data as standard NULL-terminated strings, and a repeated
subtraction was moved into a uint8_t to declutter the code.
Returns a JSON array of all configured VLANs with their IDs and names,
e.g. [{"id":1,"name":""},{"id":20,"name":"IoT"}].
The endpoint iterates VLAN IDs 1..4094 and filters by the validity bit
in sfr_data[0] (0x02), following the same pattern as vlan_create() and
vlan_setup() in rtl837x_port.c.
Also adds a small itoa16_html() helper for emitting decimal numbers
up to 4 digits (analogous to the existing 8-bit itoa_html()), used
for VLAN IDs which can reach 4094. Response builder uses the existing
vlan_name() helper for the name lookup, consistent with send_vlan().
Buffer overflow is prevented by breaking out of the iteration loop at
TCP_OUTBUF_SIZE - 60.
This endpoint is the foundation for upcoming UI improvements
(VLAN selector dropdown and overview table).
With content_type = "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "+" means space.
This case was not handled.
Also refactor the code to make a loop to process the hex digits.
Chrome sends upload requests using POST with multipart/form-data
content type in multiple packets for the header part of the form-data.
Introduce a TSTATE_MULTIPART for the httpd server states that denotes
that so far only a part of the multipart header has been transmitted.
Once the full header has been transmitted, we change to TSTATE_POST
as for Firefox which sends all the multipart header in one piece.
The main further change required then is to make sure that the parsing
of the initial part of the multipart request is only parsed once and initially
to distinguish between configuration and firmware uploads.