gitproxy/RTLPlayground
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/logicog/RTLPlayground.git synced 2026-08-30 14:52:51 +08:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

httpd: send Connection: close (single-connection uIP mitigation)

Browse Source 
Real root cause of the "web login fails from a browser but works from curl":
the uIP httpd is built with UIP_CONF_MAX_CONNECTIONS = 1 and uses global
response state (outbuf/slen/session), i.e. it serves exactly one TCP connection
at a time and closes it after each response - but never advertises that via
the Connection header. A browser's HTTP/1.1 client therefore assumes the
connection may be persistent and can park it in its keep-alive pool for reuse;
a later request sent on that pooled connection hits one the server has already
closed, and a POST (unlike a GET) is never retried by the browser, so it can
be silently lost this way.

This adds "Connection: close" to every response so the browser does not pool
and reuse a connection the server is about to drop. On its own this did not
fully explain the reported login failures - the actual authentication bug is
fixed in the next commit (the Cookie header parsed at a fixed offset) - but it
is correct behaviour for a server that only ever handles one connection, and
removes one source of dropped requests.
This commit is contained in:
d00f
2026-07-21 06:47:44 +02:00
parent ed74ec1e97
commit 3189820ba0
2 changed files with 18 additions and 9 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
httpd/httpd.c
+17 -8
View File
@@ -204,28 +204,28 @@ uint8_t parse_short(__xdata uint8_t *p)
void send_not_found(void)
{
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 404 Not found\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 404 Not found\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \
"<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC>\n<title>404 Not Found</title>\n<h1>Not Found</h1>\n");
}
void send_bad_request(void)
{
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Type: text/html\r\n\r\n" \
"<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC>\n<title>400 Bad Request</title>\n<h1>Bad Request</h1>\n");
}
void send_to_login(void)
{
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\n" \
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nConnection: close\r\n" \
"Location: login.html\r\n\r\n");
}
void send_unauthorized(void)
{
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\r\n\r\n");
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n");
}
@@ -469,14 +469,14 @@ void handle_post(void)
read_reg_timer(&last_session_use);
gen_random_bytes(session_id, SESSION_ID_LENGTH);
session_id[SESSION_ID_LENGTH] = '\0';
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nLocation: index.html\r\n" \
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nConnection: close\r\nLocation: index.html\r\n" \
"Set-Cookie: session=");
for (register uint8_t i = 0; i < SESSION_ID_LENGTH; i++)
outbuf[slen++] = session_id[i];
slen += strtox(outbuf + slen, "; SameSite=Strict\r\n\r\n");
} else {
dbg_string("Password invalid!\n");
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nLocation: login.html\r\n\r\n");
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nConnection: close\r\nLocation: login.html\r\n\r\n");
}
return;
} else if (s->tstate == TSTATE_MULTIPART || is_word(request_path, "upload") || is_word(request_path, "config")) {
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ void handle_post(void)
send_not_found();
return;
}
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n\r\n");
slen = strtox(outbuf, "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n");
return;
bad_request:
send_bad_request();
@@ -706,7 +706,16 @@ void httpd_appcall(void)
* explicit, complete policy stops privacy shields (Brave/NoScript)
* from injecting their own restrictive report-only probes that made
* the console noisy and could break the JS-driven pages. */
slen += strtox(outbuf + slen, "; charset=UTF-8\r\nCache-Control: max-age=60, must-revalidate\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\r\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'\r\n\r\n");
/* Connection: close is REQUIRED: this httpd serves exactly one
* request per TCP connection (it uip_close()s after the response),
* but without advertising it a browser keeps the socket in its
* keep-alive pool and reuses it for the next request. The reused
* request (e.g. the login POST after the GET of login.html) then
* hits the already-closed connection and is dropped - and browsers
* do NOT retry a non-idempotent POST, so the login silently fails
* while curl (fresh connection per request) works. Advertising
* close makes the browser open a fresh connection every time. */
slen += strtox(outbuf + slen, "; charset=UTF-8\r\nCache-Control: max-age=60, must-revalidate\r\nConnection: close\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *\r\nContent-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'\r\n\r\n");
len_left = f_data[entry].len;
if (len_left > (TCP_OUTBUF_SIZE - slen)) {
httpd/page_impl.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ extern __xdata char sfp_module_model[2][17];
extern __xdata char sfp_module_serial[2][17];
extern __xdata uint8_t sfp_options[2];
__code uint8_t * __code HTTP_RESPONCE_JSON = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\n\r\n";
__code uint8_t * __code HTTP_RESPONCE_JSON = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nConnection: close\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\n\r\n";
__code uint8_t * __code HTTP_RESPONCE_TXT = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n";
// Convert uint8_t to ascii HEX char push on html-buffer.